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INTRODUCTION
Boards of publicly traded corporations in the United States and in
Canada play a crucial role in the functioning of capital markets. Directors
act as advisors as well as monitors of management. They provide access
to resources and external networking opportunities, allowing firms to grow
and prosper.1 Perhaps most importantly, the board is responsible for
making decisions regarding mergers and acquisitions. Thus, the
composition of these boards is a critically important question to the area
of corporate governance.
In the United States women make up 17.7% of board members of
Russell 3000 companies.2 In Canada women comprise 15% of board seats
for reporting issuers.3 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in
20094 and the Canadian securities regulators in 20145 introduced
disclosure based models to address this issue. In the fall of 2018 California
implemented Senate Bill 8266 mandating that corporations with principal
executive offices located in California, including corporations
incorporated in jurisdictions other than California, add a certain number
of women to their boards depending on the size of board.

*
University.
1

LLM Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School, York

AARON A DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY:
CORPORATE LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY 26–27 (2015).
2
2018 Gender Diversity Index Key Findings: 2018 Progress of Women
Corporate Directors by Company Size, State and Industry Sector, 2020 WOMEN
ON BOARDS (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.2020wob.com/companies/2020-genderdiversity-index. Larger companies tend to have proportionally more women on
their boards than smaller corporations. Id.
3
Multilateral Staff Notice 58-310: Report on Fourth Staff Review of
Disclosure regarding Women on Boards and in Executive Officer Positions, ONT.
SEC. COMM'N (Sep. 27, 2018) at 1. This review also notes that as the market
capitalization increases, so too does the percentage of female directors. Id. There
is also great disparity across different industries. Id.
4
17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c) (2010); SEC, Proxy Disclosure Enhancements;
74 Fed. Reg. 68, 334 (Dec. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Final Rule].
5
National Instrument 58-101F1: Disclosure of Corporate Governance
Practices [hereinafter NI-58-101F1].
6
SB 826, Section 2, adding §301.3(f)(2) to the Corporations Code
[hereinafter Bill 826].
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This paper will first provide a critical, comparative look at the
Canadian and the federal American responses to the under-representation
of women on boards of large, publicly traded corporations. There will be
a discussion about the competing conceptions which emerge in addressing
the regulation of women on boards in the United States and Canada and
why each jurisdiction implemented its policy when it did. The conceptions
arising out of questions about under-representation of women on boards
tend to fall within two categories: business case rationales and normative
rationales. Given the competing conceptions of this issue, this paper will
attempt to demonstrate how the regulatory regimes fit within these
conceptions and the solutions which follow each conception. An argument
will be advanced that not only does each disclosure regime7 fail to provide
a solution to the underlying issue it is attempting to regulate, but also
neither regime even advances the goal the regulators purport to be
advancing. Finally, a closer look at the polarizing reactions to Bill 826
provides a hint as to the future direction of the American and Canadian
debates. This paper will be one of the first to discuss Bill 826 and what it
may mean for the U.S. and Canada.
I.

WHY THE REGULATORS DID WHAT THEY DID WHEN THEY DID

A. The US’s Reactive Approach to Corporate Governance Issues
Corporate and securities law reforms in the US are often
reactionary, following either financial crises or market failures and
scandals. In 1934 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was
established as part of a series of reforms responding to the 1929 stock
market crash. Its mandate was to protect investors, sustain fair, orderly and
efficient capital markets and facilitate capital formation,8 which is still the
SEC’s role today.9 Following the various scandals of the early 2000s, in
2002, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which is an example of
what Professor Anand defines as a mandatory corporate governance

7

The disclosure regimes being referred to are the American federal board
diversity regime and the Canadian board diversity regime.
8
Angela Foster, A Quest to Increase Women in Corporate Board
Leadership: Comparing the Law in Norway and the U.S., 26 WASH. INT'L L.J.,
381, 397 (2017).
9
The Role of the SEC, INVESTOR.GOV,
https://www.investor.gov/
introduction-investing/basics/role-sec (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).
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regime.10 Sarbanes-Oxley requires enhanced financial reporting among
other things. It is rigid, rather than enabling in its requirements.11After the
financial crisis of 2008, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act was enacted in 2010 as a reaction to this massive
market collapse.12 At the same time as Dodd-Frank was implemented
(with its objective being to protect the public from future financial failings
and abusive financial practices), 13 the SEC amended the Proxy Disclosure
Requirements ostensibly to protect investors. These amendments included
a diversity disclosure requirement.14
The Diversity Policy and Why It Was Implemented
Item 407(c) of Regulation S-K15 requires that publicly traded
companies in their Proxy Statements disclose whether the nominating
committee “considers diversity in identifying nominees for director. If the
nominating committee (or the board) has a policy with regard to the
consideration of diversity in identifying director nominees,” they must
“describe how this policy is implemented, as well as how the nominating
committee (or the board) assesses the effectiveness of its policy.”16 The
SEC in its publication of this rule, stated that diversity disclosure is
important for investors and that they had received many comments to this
effect.17 The policy, they elaborate, although not intended to “steer
behavior” may lead to benefits such as increased board independence and
10

Anita Indira Anand, An Analysis of Enabling vs. Mandatory Corporate
Governance Structures Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 229, 230
(2006).
11
Id.
12
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No.111-203, § 972, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). Its objection is stated as “An Act to
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability
and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the
American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive
financial services practices, and for other purposes.” Id.
13
Id.
14
Luis Aguilar, SEC Speech: Board Diversity: Why It Matters and How
to Improve It, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Nov. 4, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch110410laa.htm.
15
Final Rule, supra note 4.
16
Id.
17
Id at 68343.
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access to a wider talent pool of candidates.18 Their belief was that investors
would directly benefit from these disclosures.19 The SEC intentionally
declined to define diversity, leaving the definition up to reporting
corporations.20
However, scholars dispute whether it was truly not the SEC’s
intention to steer behavior with these new requirements. Professor Dhir,
for instance, reviews several criticisms of the amendments and how they
seem to amount to public shaming on the part of the SEC.21 Luis Aguilar,
an SEC Commissioner, made a speech in November of 201022 where he
revealed a number of important points regarding the intention of the board
diversity disclosure requirements. He discusses what should be done in the
future about lack of board diversity, even encouraging companies to
“prioritize and implement practices to increase board diversity.”23 This
suggests that the diversity policy was very much intended to steer behavior
in the direction of increasing board diversity. The intentions of the
diversity policy will be discussed at greater length below.
B. Canada’s Delayed Reaction Regime
Unlike the American approach to corporate governance and
securities law reforms which tend to be reactionary, and some may argue
disproportionate or unrelated to the problems the reforms are attempting
to address,24 Canada tends to take a different approach. The Canadian
approach to reforms in corporate governance is often in part a reaction to
the United States’ reactive regime.
In 2009, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) published its
proposed National Policy 58-201 “Effective Corporate Governance,”
which included a concise history of the Canadian corporate governance
regime’s progression. It began in 1994 with the Dey Report. This report
titled “Where Were the Directors?” was commissioned by the Toronto
18

Id at 68355.
Id.
20
Id at 68344.
21
Dhir, supra note 1 at 48–94.
22
Aguilar, supra note 14.
23
Id.
24
See Roberta Romano, Quack Corporate Governance Corporate
Governance, 28 YALE J. ON REG., 36 (2005); Stephen M. Bainbridge, DoddFrank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV., 1779
(2010).
19
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Stock Exchange (then the TSE, now the TSX).25 It described fourteen
recommendations of best practices for publicly traded companies.26 These
recommendations ranged from the separation of the CEO and chair of the
board to the orientation for new directors.27 Five years later, the TSE
commissioned a follow-up report titled “Five Years to the Dey,”
recognizing the importance of the original report, but also stating that
“there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution, the TSE does not require
compliance with the guidelines – but every year companies must disclose
and explain any differences between their corporate governance practices
and the guidelines.”28 Following the Dey Report, in Canada, there was a
set of exchange-endorsed “best practices,” combined with mandatory
disclosure for non-compliance with these best practices.29
Later, in 2000, the TSE established the Joint Committee on
Corporate Governance or the “Saucier Committee” designed to review the
then current state of corporate governance in Canada. This was in the wake
of the Bre-X30 and YBM Magnex scandals at the end of the 1990s.31 The
Saucier Committee’s report, published in 2001, provided
recommendations to the TSX that it change its corporate governance
guidelines with a view to developments around the world.32 In 2002, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was implemented in the United States, as described
25

National Policy 58-201: Proposed National Policy 58-201 Effective
Corporate Governance (2004) [“NP 58-201”].
26
Ruth M. Corbin, Five Years to the Dey, EUR. CORP. GOVERANCE INST.
(1999), http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/5years.pdf.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Anand, supra note 10, at 231.
30
Bre-X is one of the most notorious Canadian corporate scandals in
history. A small Alberta mining company which allegedly struck gold in
Indonesia’s stock exploded in the mid-1990s. It turned out that the projections
being publicly disclosed were a result of tampering with core samples. Once these
fraudulent disclosures were brought to light, Bre-X’s stock plummeted. For a full
description, see Christopher C. Nicholls, The Bre-X Hoax: A South East Asian
Bubble, 32 Can. Bus. L.J. 173 (1999).
31
YBM Magnex was an American “magnet” corporation, publicly
traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange. It was in fact being used to launder money
and once this was brought to the public’s attention, like Bre-X, the corporation
went into receivership in 1999. For a full description see Stephen Schneider,
Money Laundering through Securities an Analysis of Canadian Police Cases,
4 ASPER REV. INT'L BUS. & TRADE L. 169 (2004).
32
NP 58-201, supra note 25.
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above. This had an important impact on the Canadian corporate
governance regime as well. A few years later with specific reference to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Canadian securities regulators adopted NP 58201.33 This policy includes 18 best practices which arise from both
Canadian and American regulatory regimes, including recommendations
that more than half of the board should be independent, and that new board
members should undergo some sort of orientation.34
The regimes seem to diverge with the implementation of
Sarbanes-Oxley in the United States. As Anand notes, the United States
adopted a mandatory regime, where Canada issued an enabling,
disclosure-based regime.35 After the financial crisis of 2008, while the
United States federal government was rolling out Dodd-Frank and the SEC
was implementing its diversity disclosure policy, in 2009, Canadian
securities regulators proposed new versions of NP 58-201 and National
Instrument 58-101: Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices.36 In
true Canadian fashion, the securities regulators followed the Americans a
few years later with a diversity disclosure regime.
The Diversity Policy and Why It Was Implemented
Canadian securities regulators amended National Instrument 58101F1 to include a diversity policy for ostensibly different reasons from
those behind the SEC’s diversity disclosure policy. In 2013, the Ontario
government stated in its budget that it “strongly support[ed]” board gender
diversity and that it would work with the OSC in order to increase the
number of women on boards.37 Following this release, the OSC held a
roundtable in the fall of 2013. The transcript from this roundtable reveals
the intention behind the Canadian disclosure model, that is, to enhance
gender diversity on Canadian public companies’ boards.38 This stated

33

National Policy 58-201: Corporate Governance Guidelines (2005).
Carol Hansell, Canada Sets New Policy on Corporate Governance, 24
INT’L. FIN. L. REV. 37, 37 (2005).
35
Anand, supra note 10, at 229.
36
NI 58-101F1, supra note 5. See also CSA Staff Notice 58-305: Status
Report on the Proposed Changes to the Corporate Governance Regime, ONT.
SEC. COMMISSION, (Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/26274.htm.
37
Charles Sousa, A Prosperous & Fair Ontario: Budget Papers : 2013
Ontario Budget (Toronto: Ministry of Fin., 2013) at 291.
38
Roundtable Discussion Re Women on Boards and Senior
Management, ONT. SEC. COMMISSION (Oct. 16, 2013),
34
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objective is openly an attempt to steer the behavior of reporting issuers,
which marks a departure from what the United States SEC’s supposed
intentions were with its disclosure model.
The disclosure regime regarding women on boards at present
works in the following way. Reporting issuers39 must disclose whether or
not they have a policy regarding the representation of women on the board.
They must further describe what steps are taken to ensure the policy’s
effective implementation, as well as the progress in achieving its
objectives. If they do not have such a policy, they must disclose the reason
why.40 The issuer must disclose whether, and if not why not, it considers
the representation and identification of women in its director nominating
process.41 It must also disclose whether, and if not why not, the issuer has
targets regarding the representation of women on the board, and the
progress made towards reaching this target.42 Finally, the issuer must
disclose the number and percentage of women currently on its board.43
The OSC’s Consultation Paper includes a statement made by the
Minister for the Status of Women which highlights three very different
reasons for promoting board diversity. “[B]oard diversity is not about
quotas or tokenism. Board diversity is about better corporate decisions,
better responses to market demographics, and better financial
performance. It is also about the future, and having more women in key
leadership positions to serve as role models for young women and girls."44
Thus, within the reasons and justification which the OSC and Minister
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_oth_20131016_58401_transcript.htm.
39
An issuer is defined by the Ontario Securities Act as “a person or
company who has outstanding, issues or proposes to issue, a security.” A reporting
issuer is, among other things, an issuer whose shares are publicly traded. For a
complete definition, see Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 1.1 (Can.),
[“Ontario Securities Act”].
40
NI 58-101F1, supra note 5, at item 11.
41
Id at item 12.
42
Id at item 13.
43
Id at item 15. Described is the regime only as it relates to board
nomination. There are similar provisions which relate to disclosure of the
appointment of female executive officers.
44
OSC Staff Consultation Paper 58-401: Disclosure Requirements
Regarding Women on Boards and in Senior Management, ONT. SEC. COMM'N at
6 (July 30, 2013), ["Consultation Paper"].
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provide for implementing regulation are better financial performance,
better decision making, and a social justice or a “normative” rationale.
This example typifies not only the regulator’s confusion about the
conception of the problem itself, but also may explain why Canada has a
policy which does not accomplish any of these goals.

II.

COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF THE BOX OUT PROBLEM AND
RESPECTIVE SOLUTIONS

“[T]he way regulation gets framed as a problem shapes the
solutions that get conceived and adopted, as well as their prospects for
success . . . . Advocates of new regulatory initiatives should think carefully
about how to frame the problem of regulation and whether the reforms
proposed are responsive to the problems identified.”45 Hence, it is crucial
to comprehend just how the issue of women on boards is conceived if this
issue is to be regulated properly. In both the United States and in Canada,
there are two competing conceptions of this problem, and so two
competing conceptions of the solution to said problem.46 First, there is the
idea that corporations, by under-including women on their boards, are
missing out on what Rosenblum calls the “instrumental” value of women
or the “diversity dividend.”47 The second conception of the problem is
given that women represent half the population and half the labor force,48
it is simply not right that they should be so poorly represented on public
corporate boards. Within these conceptions are a myriad of reasons for
why women may not be advancing to the upper echelons of corporate US

45
Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS
L.J. 633, 680–81 (2012).
46
There is an assumption here that this is indeed a problem and that there
should be some regulation to remedy it. Therefore not included is the third
conception that lack of boardroom diversity is not an issue and therefore requires
no regulation.
47
Darren Rosenblum, When Does Sex Diversity on Boards Benefit
Firms?, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 429, 431 (2017).
48
Dhir, supra note 1, at 39.
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and Canada including, inter alia, cognitive bias,49 the pool problem,50 and
free choice. 51
The conception of the problem (that is the under-representation of
women on boards) leads to two rationales for the solution to the problem:
the business case rationale, and the normative rationale. Both of these
justifications for addressing the under-representation of women on boards
are common to the U.S. and Canada.
A.

The Business Case

The business case itself has many iterations. One form it takes,
which is very popular and politically attractive because it is linked to the
view that a board’s duty is to increase shareholder wealth, is the following:
enhanced gender diversity on corporate boards increases corporations’
financial performance.52 A number of studies relating to this formulation

49

See Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate
Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference Make, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377,
404–408 (2014) (noting cognitive bias, or "in group" bias, is present in the
corporate management pipeline that feeds new additions to the corporate boards,
and that individuals feel for those who are like them in race, gender, and
ethnicity); Dhir, supra note 1, at 47–54.
50
See Geneva R. Fountain, The Case for the Business Case Rationale,
15 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 81, 90–91 (2016) (noting that the hiring pool is often
limited to those with board experience, often drawing from older or retired
members 'the pool' which few women are a part of); Dhir, supra note 1, at 38–47.
51
Richard A. Epstein, Is Women’s Empowerment a Bureaucratic
Imperative?, HOOVER INST. (Mar. 3, 2012),
https://www.hoover.org/research/womens-empowerment-bureaucraticimperative.
52
Aaron A. Dhir, Towards a Race and Gender-Conscious Conception
of the Firm: Canadian Corporate Governance, Law and Diversity, 35 QUEEN’S
L.J. 569, 574 (2010); Rhode & Packel, supra note 49; Quick Take: Why Diversity
and Inclusion Matter: Financial Performance, CATALYST (Aug. 1, 2018),
https://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/why-diversity-and-inclusion-matterfinancial-performance; see Fawn Lee, Show Me the Money: Using the Business
Case Rationale to Justify Gender Targets in the EU European Union Law, 36
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1471 (2013); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity
Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story Board Diversity and Corporate
Performance: Filling in the Gaps, 89 N.C. L. REV. 855 (2010); David Carter et al,
The Diversity of Corporate Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance,
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of the business case have been performed. These studies use a variety of
financial performance metrics. I will call these the “metrics studies.”
1. The Metrics Studies
Using various financial metrics, a substantial amount of empirical
data has shown a positive relationship between increased gender diversity
on corporate boards and better financial performance in North America
and internationally. Studies have shown a positive relationship between
increased gender diversity on boards and Tobin’s Q,53 Return on Assets
(ROA),54 Return on Sales (ROS),55 Return on Equity (ROE),56 and Return
on Investment (ROI).57 For example, using a statistical analysis of data
gathered from 641 Fortune 500 firms over about 25,000 firm years from
1998-2002,58 one study found a significant and positive, causal
relationship between the percentage of female directors and firm
performance as measured by Tobin’s Q.59 Conyon and He, in a study of
over 3,000 public American firms between 2007-2014, found that there
SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 972763 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research
Network, 2007); Fountain, supra note 50.
53
Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio comparing a firm’s value with the
cost of replacing its assets. CHRISTOPHER C. NICHOLLS, CORPORATE FINANCE
AND CANADIAN LAW 2 E144 (2013).
54
Return on Assets is an accounting measure which reveals how much
revenue can be generated from assets. It is calculated by dividing total earnings
by total assets. Fountain, supra note 50, at 86.
55
Return on Sales is an accounting measure determined by dividing the
pre-tax profit divided by revenue. Nancy M. Carter et al, The Bottom Line:
Corporate Performance and Women’s Representation on Boards (2004-2008)
n.4, CATALYST (2011)
https://www.catalyst.org/system/files/the_bottom_line_corporate_performance_
and_women%27s_representation_on_boards_%282004-2008%29.pdf.
56
Return on equity is an accounting measure determined by dividing
total income by equity, or shares. See Fountain, supra note 50, at 86.
57
Return on Investment is another measure of firm performance
calculated by dividing after tax net operating profit by invested capital. Carter et
al, supra note 55, at n.5.
58
Carter et al, supra note 52, at 12–23. The authors, although the
evidence suggested a causal relationship, were hesitant to draw conclusions about
causation because of the possibility that a third variable could have increased both
gender diversity and enhanced financial performance. Id.
59
Id. at 21–23. The authors, although the evidence suggested a causative
relationship, were hesitant to draw conclusions about causation because of the
possibility that a third variable could have increased both gender diversity and
enhanced financial performance.
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was a positive relationship between increased gender diversity and
Tobin’s Q.60 Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader in a study of 127 large US
companies from 1993 to 1998, found that board diversity had a positive
impact on organizational performance as measured by ROA and Return
on Investment Capital.61 Further, Schwartz-Ziv’s study demonstrated that
gender balance on corporate boards, specifically when a critical mass of
female directors was present on a board, was positively related to net profit
margins and ROE.62 Eastman, Rallis, and Mazzuchelli, in a study
conducted using data from 2011 to 2016 of corporations from the MSCI
All Country World Index (ACWI), determined that companies with a
critical mass of female directors outperformed those with no female
directors as measured by ROE.63 Similarly, in 2018, McKinsey in a global
study of organizations found that those firms in the top quartile for
diversity on boards outperformed those in the lowest quartile measured by
ROE.64
However, there are also several studies which demonstrate either
no relationship or a negative relationship between greater board gender
diversity and firm financial performance using the same financial metrics
as a measure of firm performance. For example, Carter et al in a
subsequent study found there was no relationship between board diversity
and financial performance using Tobin’s Q as a financial performance

60

Martin J. Conyon & Lerong He, Firm Performance and Boardroom
Gender Diversity: A Quantile Regression Approach, 79 J. BUS. RESEARCH 198,
203 (2017).
61
See Nicolas L. Erhardt et al, Board of Director Diversity and Firm
Financial Performance, CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT'L REV. (2003).
62
Miriam Schwartz-Ziv, Does the Gender of Directors Matter?, SSRN
Scholarly Paper ID 2257867 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network,
2013) at 3.-22. In this study critical mass was said to have been reached when
there was the presence of 3 or more of a certain gender on a board. See infra,
Section xx (insert) for a broader discussion of ‘critical mass.’
63
MEGGIN T. EASTMAN ET AL, THE TIPPING POINT: WOMEN ON BOARDS
AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE, MSCI 23, 15 (2016)
https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/fd1f8228-cc07-4789-acee3f9ed97ee8bb.
64
Vivian Hunt et. al., Delivering through Diversity, MCKINSEY &
COMPANY
(2018),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/organizati
on/our%20insights/delivering%20through%20diversity/delivering-throughdiversity_full-report.ashx.
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metric.65 Adams and Ferreira, using data from 1996-2003, concluded that
there was a negative relationship between enhanced gender diversity and
ROA as well as Tobin’s Q.66 Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar also
conducted a study examining Norwegian firms before and after Norway
implemented a mandatory quota for the proportion of women public
corporations were required to have on their boards. This study showed that
the quota had a negative impact on firm performance measured by Tobin’s
Q.67 Schwartz-Ziv makes an excellent point about this study. She states
that this study is looking at a case where gender diversity was increased
on boards in “one fell swoop,” not gradually over time and so the results
do not necessarily showcase what lasting gender diversity means for
corporate performance.68 Some studies above found statistically negative
relationships as well as positive relationships between board gender
diversity and firm financial performance, depending on the metric that was
used. For instance, although Conyon and He found a positive correlation
between board gender diversity and Tobin’s Q, they found a statistically
significant negative relationship between same and ROA.69
The Weakness of the Financial Performance Business Case
Studies showing no relationship or a negative relationship
between increased board gender diversity and firm financial performance
pose a significant problem for proponents of the financial performance
business case. As Rhode and Packel point out, the empirical research “has
not convincingly established that board diversity leads to improved
financial performance.”70 Fairfax speculates that the lack of convincing

65

David A. Carter et al, The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards
and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance: Board Diversity and
Financial Performance, 18 Corp. GOVERNANCE: INT'L REV. 396, 408 (2010).
66
Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the boardroom and
Their Impact on Governance and Performance” 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, pincite??
(2009).
67
Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards:
The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation 127
Q. J. OF ECON. 137, 168 (2012).
68
Schwartz-Ziv, supra note 62, at 8. But see Ahern & Dittmar, supra
note 67 at 183. Ahern and Dittmar do recognize this and point out that the negative
relationship is not necessarily because of the gender of the board, but could have
been instead a result of the inexperienced directors appointed to fulfill the quota
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business case evidence is likely the reason board gender diversity has seen
what she calls a “stagnation” in recent years.71
"[M]ost knowledgeable scholars, those who do business and
corporate finance rather than race and gender subjects, deny . . . that any
correlation exists . . . [and] empirical work on the subject conclusively
finds that no correlation can be found".72 Opponents of stronger regulation
often point to the weakness of the financial performance business case.
One argument is that there are inherent difficulties with all of the above
studies. It is extremely difficult to prove causation; at best what is normally
found is correlation.73 Rhode and Packel say there may be another factor
which is causing both stronger financial performance and enhancing board
gender diversity.74 The McKinsey Report acknowledges that its work only
reveals correlation and not causation and raises that it is possible that
already high performing corporations are able to dedicate resources to
diversity efforts, which may explain the correlation between high
performing corporations and greater board diversity.75 The report does
assert, however, that “in practice, this seems unlikely. We have observed
that most companies only embark on a major transformation when they
have a burning platform to do so.”76
Both American and Canadian scholars have written on the
difficulties faced by many of the studies. For example, the sample sizes in
these studies are often small and the observations are often over a short
time period.77 There are known methodological issues with these empirical
studies as well, including a lack of good quality data, and measurement
difficulties.78 In the above studies, for example, a number of them are only
71
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across periods of four or five years and some only use data from a small
number of firms.79 Fountain also articulates that when using financial
metrics as a measure of firm performance, inconsistent findings can still
be reached even when the same metrics and time periods are used to collect
data.80 No one has yet to perform a study which examines the long term
stock performance and its relationship to increased gender diversity on the
corporate board, at least not with data from the US or Canada. Long term
stock performance is what Grundfest refers to as the “gold standard” of
firm financial performance.81
Defenses to the Weaknesses
However, even with the issue of causation and lack of proof that
increased gender diversity on corporate boards is positively related to long
term stock performance, the business case is not dismantled. The inherent
methodological difficulties pose equal challenges for the studies showing
positive, negative, and no relationship. Further, no scholar has yet to prove
that board gender diversity is bad for firms or the capital markets. Thus,
the firm financial performance business case may still prove useful.
What may be missing in the above studies is a regard for critical
mass82 and shareholder protection measures. Critical mass stems from the
idea that if there is only one female within a group, the group will only
consider her a “token” female, who is a representative in her capacity as a
woman. On this view, it is only once a group reaches a critical mass of
women that the transformation occurs.83 The meaning of the critical mass
threshold on a board of directors shifts among scholars. Some define it as
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twenty percent,84 thirty percent,85 thirty-five percent,86 and still others as
three women,87 irrespective of the size of the board of which they are
members. When scholars consider critical mass, as do Schwartz-Ziv and
Bruno et al. in their studies, the results are striking. Schwartz-Ziv observes
that most studies use data from boards with an average of ten percent
female directors which may not showcase the true impact of gender that
can be seen in more gender-balanced boardrooms.88 The contribution that
a female director can make as one of three women rather than as the sole
female director may be very different.89 Therefore, Schwartz-Ziv
addresses the issue of critical mass for both genders in an Israeli context
where there has been board gender balance for twenty years.90 The results
of this study reveal not only that gender-balanced boards work harder, as
indicated by a content analysis of the board meeting minutes, but also this
hard work, the author concludes, “trickles up” to firm financial
performance because there is a parallel positive correlation between
gender-balanced boards and ROE as well as net profit.91 Bruno et al., in
their study of Italian listed corporations, subject to a quota law which took
effect over the course of six years, found that when the percentage of
female directors was ten percent, the impact which gender diversity had
was negative on firm performance, that the impact was insignificant at
twenty percent, and that the relationship was positive and significant past
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twenty percent.92 They used ROA, ROE, ROIC and ROS as measurements
of firm performance.93
In addition to critical mass, the issue of endogeneity and reverse
causality is dealt with in the Schwartz-Ziv, Bruno et al, and in the Conyon
and He studies.94 Skeptics of the financial performance business case often
lean on problems of endogeneity and reverse causality to support
arguments against stronger regulation. It is unclear, many say, whether or
not there is some other variable which enhances both financial
performance and board gender diversity, or alternatively, whether better
financial performance leads to better gender representation on boards.95
However, in Schwartz-Ziv’s study, she asserts that it is unlikely that there
could be a problem of endogeneity or reverse causality because she looked
at both “below the surface” board work (the work of the board extrapolated
from meeting minutes) and observed a positive relationship with this and
output (financial performance). Thus, it would seem that the work of the
board, which is positively related to a critical mass of female
representation, has a positive relationship with ROE and net profits.96
Conyon and He also accounted for endogeneity and reverse causality in
their quantile regression study and concluded that lower performing firms
are less likely to make the most of female directors’ value because of their
perception of threats which arise out of their declining performance.97
As theorized by Fountain, studies often do not take into account
shareholder rights and this could account for the inconsistent findings in
the studies above.98 In fact, Adams and Ferreira’s study showed that
corporations with stronger shareholder rights were much more likely to
reap the positive impacts of enhanced board diversity, whereas
corporations with weak shareholder rights were more likely to see a
negative impact on firm financial performance when board gender
diversity increased.99 Thus, perhaps if shareholder rights were accounted
for in the remainder of the above studies, we would see more consistent
results.
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As theorized by Fountain, studies also often do not take into
account shareholder rights and this could account for the inconsistent
findings in the studies above.100 In fact, Adams and Ferreira’s study
showed that corporations with stronger shareholder rights were much
more likely to reap the positive impacts of enhanced board diversity,
whereas corporations with weak shareholder rights were more likely to see
a negative impact on firm financial performance when board gender
diversity increased.101 Thus, perhaps if shareholder rights were accounted
for in the remainder of the above studies, we would see more consistent
results.102
Finally, while the empirical evidence linking director
independence with enhanced firm financial performance is also mixed,
corporations are still very willing to implement reforms.103 The question
remains as to why diversity has seen so much less traction in both the
United States and Canada.104 All in all, the financial performance business
case may need some re-working before it is able to effect real change, but
it does seem that the gap in the research may be filled with studies which
account for critical mass, endogeneity, and shareholder protection
measures.105
2. The Governance Case
Beyond the business rationale as calculated entirely by financial
performance metrics, there is another version of the business case.106 This
rationale uses empirical data, qualitative data, and theoretical data to show
that more women on boards have a positive relationship with enhanced
corporate governance.107 I will call this the “governance case.” The theory
behind the governance case is that gender diversity leads to better decision
100
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making, corporate reputation and corporate governance generally, and
thus is better for business.108 This rationale is not directly linked to
shareholder value as the financial performance rationale is.109 Instead, by
enhancing governance board gender diversity brings value to a corporation
in various other ways.110
i.

Better Decisions

As Sonnenfeld outlines, the highest performing corporations are
those with “extremely contentious boards that regard dissent as an
obligation . . . .”111 This is consistent with many scholars’ views that
groupthink is a common and problematic challenge faced by homogenous
corporate boards.112 Groupthink is a phenomenon where members of a
group are unable to consider alternatives because they place the agreement
of the group above constructive dissent.113 Constructive dissent and
elimination of groupthink go hand in hand.114 In theory, female directors
are thought to bring with them an outsider perspective and rather than
agreeing with the group as a whole, they will probe more deeply and ask
management more challenging questions than the typical male board
member.115 Empirical evidence suggests that diverse groups solve
problems better than homogeneous ones.116 Furthermore, female directors
tend to have less attendance problems than their male counterparts.117
When there are more women on a board this also reduces the male director
attendance problems.118 Meeting attendance is important for corporate
governance as it is one of the most crucial ways directors fulfill their
fiduciary duties119 to the corporation and the shareholders (in the American
context). Thus, with more constructive dissent and better attendance this
108
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should at least better the monitoring function of the board and lead to better
performance as an organization.120
ii.

Increased Independence

By virtue of being “outsiders” with fresh perspectives, female
directors are typically more independent than their male counterparts.121
Increased independence has been thought to be a positive change for quite
some time in the corporate governance realm.122 Dating back to when
Jensen and Meckling proposed the Theory of the Firm in the 1970s, board
independence has in Tingle’s opinion become conflated with corporate
governance. 123 Management, the agent of the shareholders, must be
monitored by the board in order to ensure that the agents are acting within
the principals’ best interests and not only their own.124 Therefore it is
thought that the more independent the directors are, the better monitors of
management they will be. Hence, the more female directors a board has,
the more independent the board will be and thus the stronger monitors of
management.125 Adams and Ferreira note that in their large sample of S&P
corporations, 84.07% of female directors acted as independent directors.126
Research also indicates that female directors tend to engage in tougher
monitoring of management.127 In addition, it has been empirically shown
that greater female representation on boards leads to greater CEO turnover
when stock performance is poor.128 This relationship is not shown simply
when there is a greater presence of independent directors generally, but
only when these directors are female.129
120
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Corporate Reputation

Part of the business case which does not relate directly to financial
performance, but which may have an indirect effect on a corporation’s
share price at least, is the idea that increased board gender diversity
enhances corporate reputation.130 This is a very difficult portion of the
business case to criticize as it seems to be supported both pragmatically
and by empirical evidence.131 Even serious critics of corporate governance
predictors in both the United States and Canada cannot deny the fact that
in this age corporate reputation is crucially important to a business’
functioning and ultimately may impact upon its share price.132 Last year,
BlackRock’s CEO Larry Fink wrote a letter to the CEOs of public
companies, expressing his opinion that diversity is better for the long-term
of the corporation and for its shareholders.133 Thus, even if one does not
accept that a corporation’s reputation may suffer if it has poor board
diversity, it may still be the case that the corporation becomes the target of
shareholder activism.134
Further, those with better corporate reputations may have
opportunities that corporations with poorer reputations do not.135 For
example, the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) recently
launched a Women in Leadership Fund, a prospectus offering for a fund
that is only available to corporations which have a minimum of 30%
female executives, female board members, or who have signed the
Catalyst 2022 Accord.136 This fund also excludes companies who deal
mainly in the business of alcohol and tobacco, among other things, and
those which have been linked to major social or governance scandals.137

130

Id.
Id.
132
Id.
133
Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2019 Letter to CEOs Purpose & Profit,
BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-finkceo-letter.
134
Id.
135
Alexandra Posadzki, CIBC to Launch Canada’s First Women in
Leadership Bond for Institutional Investors, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Sept. 11,
2018),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/streetwise/article-cibc-tolaunch-canadas-first-women-in-leadership-bond-for; see also Catalyst, Catalyst
Accord 2022: Accelerating The Advancement of Women, CATALYST (Nov. 8,
2012), https://www.catalyst.org/catalyst-accord-2022.
136
Id.
137
Id.
131

306BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW VOL. XII:II
iv.

The Weaknesses of the Governance Case

The difficulties with the governance case are two-fold. First,
similarly to the financial performance case, the governance case is fraught
with inconsistent empirical evidence. In a review of the literature
regarding the presence of greater board diversity and corporate
governance, Rhode and Packel note “[o]verall, studies on the relationship
between board diversity and its capacity for strategic change have reached
conflicting results.”138 They also outline the conflicting empirical results
concerning whether diversity enhances monitoring or whether it hinders
communication between the board and management.139 Adams and
Ferreira’s study illustrates that because female directors are typically
stronger monitors than their male counterparts, greater gender diversity
can lead to over-monitoring and hurt boards that already perform well. So
in some contexts where a firm is already performing well, it is possible
that increasing the number of female directors on a board may damage
governance. 140
Secondly, it is not clear that typical corporate governance
predictors lead to increased firm performance in general. There is still a
question of whether director independence benefits a firm financially.
Practices identified by regulators and policymakers as corporate
governance best practices are not always accurate indicators of how well
a corporation will perform financially, whether it will be involved in a
scandal or whether it will fail.141
3.

The Talent Case

“At Catalyst, we encourage companies to go beyond the
traditional business case by focusing on diversity and inclusion as talent
issues, rather than as the ‘bottom line.’”142 This is a third iteration of the
business case and it is by no means a new one. For instance, Carter et al.
in 2007, in describing the business case for board diversity, include the
fact that increased diversity means access to a wider talent pool.143 In a
more recent study, Eastman et al. found companies with at least three
138
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female directors outperformed those with none144. They supported these
findings with two hypotheses, one of which is that well-performing
corporations with more female directors were making better use of the
talent supply available to them.145
In a study of venture capitalist investment firms, Gompers and
Kovali partly accounted for their finding, that diverse partnerships led to
higher returns than homogenous ones, by drawing a comparison between
their results and the upturn in the economy after the 1960s.146 This
economic boom was because the labor market began accessing both
women and people of color.147
Dhir explains another facet of the talent case in the Canadian
context. He describes a phenomenon where Canadian corporations were
actually losing talented women to other countries more concerned with
board diversity, which were better at seeking and recruiting talented
women.148 He thus advocated for policy intervention to catalyze the slow
growth of board diversity in Canada.149 Interestingly, Dhir was writing at
a time when the diversity disclosure policy in Canada was very new, and
yet his point that voluntary efforts in Canada to increase boardroom gender
diversity had not worked is still true today.150
Pool Problem
The talent case rationale runs up against one of the most common
arguments used by those who oppose stronger regulation to increase the
number of women on boards. This argument is the “pool problem”. Those
who are convinced that there is a lack of qualified female candidates are
unlikely to be persuaded that firms should simply extend their search
beyond the pool which they consider “qualified”. Qualifications for board
candidacy usually include executive experience with an emphasis on CEO
experience. 151 The pool may not, in fact, be a problem. Dhir argues that
the pool problem might be based on an inaccurate conception of the
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Canadian and US labor markets.152 It could also be that women are held
more strictly to the CEO standard than male candidates.153
It may be that successful corporations tend to have more diverse
boards because they have the means to support diversity efforts.154 It is
possible that these are the corporations better able to recruit the most
qualified diverse candidates.155 It is not clear that by extending the pool of
what they consider qualified candidates, lower performing corporations
would realize a diversity dividend.156 This line of thinking, of course, rests
on the assumption that it is not diversity which creates value at high
performing firms and the correlation runs the other way.157 If, on the other
hand, we accept that diversity brings instrumental value, then this justifies
extending the pool within which director candidates are found.158 Thus,
the pool problem falls flat. Another interesting counter to this is the reverse
pool problem.159 In the Erhardt et al. study, the authors point to the fact
that at the time of writing there was a dearth of qualified male candidates
to fill board positions.160 This may not still be a problem, but, if it is, then
an expanded pool of candidates would be necessary to account for this
pool problem.161
Business Case Conclusion
“Given the competing findings and methodological limitations of
these studies, the financial benefits of board diversity should not be
overstated.”162 The business case in its current formulation may need some
reworking if it is to be compelling enough to effect real change.163
However, given that there is certainly a lack of evidence which goes
against the financial performance based business case, the empirical
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evidence generally does not hinder the normative rationale for greater
gender diversity on boards in both the United States and Canada.164
More broadly, the business case faces the challenge that is
described by Rosenblum and Dhir. That is, if we justify increased gender
diversity on boards by arguing that it will lead to better firm performance,
this makes it seem that if women cannot show their instrumental worth,
they do not deserve a seat at the table.165 For proponents of gender
diversity, this again does not damage the normative case.166 Unless the
empirical evidence definitively proves that gender diversity impairs
financial performance, there is still a compelling case for increasing board
gender diversity on normative grounds.167
Another reason why the business case has yet to be convincing is it is
“inextricably linked with the moral or social case for board diversity
because moral and social rationales are embedded in the so-called business
case.”168 This point will be addressed in greater detail below.
B.

The Normative Case

The normative case is far less complex than the business case. It has
two versions. The first is that gender diversity on boards should be
promoted as it is simply the right thing to do.169 The second is that it is
right to promote diversity on corporate boards because the diverse groups
(women and ethnic minorities) are those which have been historically
disadvantaged.170 We should, therefore, have regulation to ameliorate this.
These versions of the normative case are identically conceptualized in the
United States and Canada, and can be seen above in the Canadian and
American regulators’ discussions of the diversity policies.171 A McKinsey
report recognizes that “social justice, legal compliance, or maintaining
industry-standard employee environment protocols is typically the initial
164
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impetus behind these [diversity] efforts . . .”172 Paul Davies and Klaus
Hopt, in discussing European policy reforms related to board diversity,
said: “Although both reforms are advocated on the basis that they will
promote the economic success of the company, it is not clear whether this
will be the case and it is even less clear whether economic success from
the perspective of the shareholders is the objective of the reforms.”173
Thus, the catalyzing factor behind reforming board diversity policies is
usually rooted in the normative case.174
If one accepts a purely normative case, stronger regulation such as
quotas seems to be the logical solution to the lack of female directors.175
However, normative objectives influencing the regulation of the inner
workings of corporate boards in the private sector will not be able to
escape the business case in the US and Canada.176 The securities regulators
are charged with promoting fairness and efficiency in the capital
markets.177 Their mandates make it very difficult, if not impossible, to
openly pursue an objective which is purely normative.178
There is though, as Rosenblum points out, a certain amount of
normative “slippage” into the business case.179 The regulators in the US
and Canada, as described above, support their use of diversity regulation
with business case and investor protection rationales.180 Yet, they seem to
in fact be working from a normative-based rationale.181 One can see this
from the fact that the Ontario and Federal governments in Canada
instructed the OSC to tackle this issue in order to “facilitate an increase in
the participation of women on the boards . . . .”182 Unlike the SEC, these
government actors are transparent about the end result which the
regulation is to achieve, a result that appears to be indifferent to any likely
172
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effect of increased board diversity on firm performance. It is notable that,
in the case of Ontario, it was the Minister Responsible for Women’s
Issues, in conjunction with the Minister of Finance, and not the Minister
of Finance alone, who provided this instruction.
In the US, from Luis Aguilar’s speech as discussed above, we see
a similar normative slippage. He even suggests that a Rooney Rule may
be useful in promoting board diversity. The Rooney Rule was a technique
used by the NFL to encourage more diverse hiring of coaches in which at
least one diverse candidate was to be interviewed in the final rounds of
hiring.183
The Normative Case’s Biggest Hurdles
i.

The Board’s Role is to Maximize Shareholder Wealth

Perhaps the most powerful argument opponents of stronger
regulation have in their arsenal is based on the premise that the board’s
role is primarily to maximize shareholder wealth. In the United States, the
conception of the board’s role as a shareholder wealth maximizer,
especially where a change of control is inevitable, is fairly well accepted.
Generally, in the US, the directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation
as a whole and the shareholders thereof.184 In a takeover context, where a
change of control is inevitable, the board’s duty according to the Revlon
line of cases becomes a duty to maximize shareholder wealth.185 In
Canada, on the other hand, in both the federal and provincial corporate
statutes, the board’s fiduciary duty is only owed to the corporation as a
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whole.186 Although there is reason to think that the Revlon duty has been
applied in Canada –187 since at least 2008 – the Canadian Supreme Court
in its BCE decision, 188 ruled that even in a Revlon-type situation, the board
should consider all stakeholders rather than simply the shareholders in
making its decision.189 So the duty of the board as a shareholder wealth
maximizer in Canada is less clear. However, it is important to note that the
board in BCE, even after considering other stakeholders, made a decision
that favored the wealth maximization of its shareholders and the court was
unwilling to strike this decision. Therefore, one could argue that despite
the more stakeholder-centric model in Canada, a board is still at least
permitted to prioritize the shareholders so long as it also fairly considers
other stakeholders in its decision.
If one assumes that a board’s role is to maximize shareholder
wealth, one is led to the ultimate conclusion that boards should only
undergo large scale transformation if this will benefit the corporation’s
shareholders. Under this assumption, it is difficult to justify a quota-based
regulatory model unless this will also generate shareholder wealth. Even
more challenging, is the evidence from Norway. When a quota was
introduced for women on boards, public corporations were left scrambling
to find additional women to sit on their boards, leading in some cases to
the appointment of less experienced directors. This caused, it has been
argued, a downturn in the market and losses for the shareholders of these
companies.190 Schwartz-Ziv’s study of Government Business Companies
in Israel, though, shows better financial performance when there was
gender balance on boards for over 20 years in a context where the
corporations are required by law to maximize shareholder value.191 This is
186
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an excellent example of the positive effect of adequate gender
representation over the course of many years in a context where
shareholder wealth maximization is mandated and where gender parity
increases financial performance. More generally, one could argue that so
long as no damage to the capital markets can be reasonably linked to
regulatory efforts to improve gender diversity on boards, such regulation
in Canada and the US is justified purely on the basis that it is the right
thing to do.
ii.

Command-and-Control Regulation is Inappropriate State
Interference with the Private Sector

State interference with the inner-workings of the corporate board
is perceived in a negative light in both jurisdictions, but perhaps more
strongly in the United States. American legal scholarship, views
command-and-control measures disdainfully.192 In Short’s review of
American legal scholarship over a 25 year period, she found that the most
common criticism was that command-and-control regulation is a form of
state coercion with a negative impact upon the choices of those subject to
the regulation.193 Opponents of command-and-control are especially
critical of the SEC regulating corporate governance. The SEC, in the
opinion of some, does not have the appropriate tools to deal with the issue
of corporate governance. For instance, Gallagher, an SEC Commissioner,
in criticizing the SEC’s attempts to meddle in corporate governance,
asserted: “If most corporate governance issues are a nail, the states
represent a hammer, while the SEC represents, say, a wrench, or worse yet
a sledge hammer! Let’s not become the wrench in the works of corporate
governance when we have a toolbox full of fifty hammers.”194 Epstein, in
comparing the EU’s proposed quota mandate and the US’ flexible
approach, asserts: “The question then arises of why it makes sense, in this
time of economic malaise, to impose this costly and intrusive quota on
firms that already have every incentive to pick the best board members”.195
His article, written in 2012, provided a hint as to what reaction a quota
mandate in the US might receive. Alstott makes the point clear. She says
“quotas sit uneasily with deeply-held beliefs (in the United States) about

192

Dhir, supra note 1 at 94.
Short, supra note 45 at 662.
194
Daniel M Gallagher, The Proper Role of the Federal Government in
Corporate Governance, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 1, 2013),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/02/01/the-proper-role-of-the-federalgovernment-in-corporate-governance/.
195
Epstein, supra note 51.
193

314BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW VOL. XII:II
the role of government and law in regulating business.”196 In Canada,
command-and-control is less feared and the securities regulators do not
face the same challenge as the SEC because it is thought to be within the
purview of Canadian securities regulators to regulate corporate
governance. 197
Short counters the opponents of command-and-control regulation
with a persuasive argument that “tyrannophobia” when it comes to
securities regulation and taxes is a misplaced fear. Tyrannophobia in this
context, she advances, not only detracts from real issues of inappropriate
state interference (such as torture and secret wiretapping) but it also makes
it difficult for regulators to properly address issues because they constantly
have to be concerned with rebutting command-and-control based
arguments.198 Thus, it may be that fear of command-and-control is more a
distraction from the real problems in need of regulation than a constructive
form of discourse in an age of complex financial institutions and capital
markets capable of destroying the economy if not run properly.
iii.

Let the Market Decide

Richard Epstein, in comparing the American approach to gender
diversity to that of the EU, provided the following critique of the European
approach:
“Women are, in ever-larger numbers, graduating from
universities with advanced degrees in business and
196
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management. As they move up the ranks, their presence
on boards may well increase, wholly without quotas….
Firms have every incentive to pick the best board
members, male or female… So what is the difference
between the Wall Street Journal and the EU’s approach?
Simple. The former uses voluntary action and enlists
high-profile leaders to make its case, while the latter uses
coercion in a ham-handed effort to achieve some narrow
and counterproductive initiative toward the same general
end.”199
This combines both fear of coercion and the supposition that if
given time the markets will correct the under-representation of women on
boards. The latter is a similar argument, found in Fountain’s paper. She
purports that the best remedy for the issue of women on boards may be
time. The market will adjust to the social pressure placed on large
corporations to enhance board gender diversity.200 There is clearly an
increasing push for diversity efforts in the market as well. As discussed
above, Larry Fink’s letter and the launch of CIBC’s Women in Leadership
Fund are just two examples of pushes from the private sector rather than
government indicating that the market is moving in the direction of
demanding greater gender diversity on corporate boards. One view of the
regulators’ initiatives is that they were responding to market developments
as expressed by comments from investors who saw boardroom diversity
as a laudable goal.201
However, scholars have illustrated the flaws with this market
evolution argument. In the OSC’s 2013 Roundtable regarding women on
boards, in discussing the rate of change, a panelist, Pamela Jeffrey,
remarked, “we will not be anywhere close to gender parity until 2097 at
this pace of change here between half a percent and a percent a year. So
2097, we're all dead, and our children are dead, and our grandchildren. So
let's get on with [it].”202 Although the rate of change has improved since
2013, in Canada it will still take approximately 50 more years to reach
199
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gender parity, and this is assuming that board seats will be filled by 50%
women, a higher female fill rate than there currently is.203 In the US, it is
predicted that it will take similarly approximately 30 years to reach gender
parity.204 Thus, even assuming a higher fill-rate than there is in Canada,
the market likely will not correct this problem until the writer is
approaching old age.

C.

How The Regulators Use the Business Case
and the Normative Case

The SEC and the OSC have very similar mandates. The SEC’s is
to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and to
facilitate capital formation.205 The OSC’s is to protect investors from
unfair, improper or fraudulent practices, to foster fair and efficient capital
markets and confidence in capital markets, and to contribute to the stability
of the financial system and the reduction of systemic risk.206 Thus, the
policies, which each of these regulators can implement, must fit within
virtually identical scopes.
Further to the discussion above, the OSC in its Request for Comment on
the proposed NI 58-101F1 amendments said the following: “The Proposed
Amendments are intended to encourage more effective boards and better
corporate decision making by requiring greater transparency for investors
and other stakeholders regarding the representation of women on boards
and in senior management of TSX-listed and other non-venture issuers.
This transparency is intended to assist investors when making investment
and voting decisions.”207 Most recently at the 2017 roundtable discussing
203
Roundtable Discussion - Third Review of Women on Boards and in
Executive Officer Positions ONT. SEC. COMMISSION (Oct. 24, 2017),
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/SecuritiesCategory5/sn_20171103_transcript-wob-roundtable.pdf.
204
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ONT. SEC.COMMISSION, (Jan. 15, 2014),
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women on boards, OSC Chair, Maureen Jensen, said that the Commission
views this as a “governance issue”.208 However, in light of both the above
quote by the Minister for Women’s Issues and given that it was the
Minister for the Status of Women and not just the Minister of Finance
obliging the Commission to look at this issue, the true purpose of the
gender diversity proposal seems clear: that is, to advance a goal rooted in
fairness.
Likewise, in the US, SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar’s
comments show that the true intentions of item 407(c) in Regulation S-K
seem to be rooted in promoting a normative goal, rather than in protecting
investors.209 Aguilar made the following statement in 2013: “Given the
evidence of the impact diversity on boards has on the bottom line and the
boardroom changes taking place with our counter- parts across the globe,
gender diversity – and diversity in general – should be a priority for U.S.
companies and their boards."210 Aguilar went on to claim that corporate
board diversity was important to investors and board diversity disclosure
will help investors make informed decisions.211 Thus, the rationale behind
the diversity disclosure regime was almost identical to the one provided
by the Canadian securities regulators. It includes the notion that board
diversity will enhance financial performance, that it will lead to improved
corporate governance, and that it will better protect investors. However,
Aguilar’s speech also reveals a normative rationale behind the disclosure
policy.
What is striking in the US and Canada is that although they
implemented different board diversity regulatory regimes at different
times for allegedly different reasons, the work each disclosure model has
done is similar. There has not been a dramatic change to the number and
percentage of women on boards in either jurisdiction since these
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reforms.212 Perhaps this is because the conceptions of the problem board
diversity proposals are designed to address in both the US and Canada and
their respective solutions are almost identical. Moreover, perhaps
corporations have remained unconvinced of the financial or other
governance benefits of board diversity and believe that the securities
regulators are in fact advancing a normative goal indirectly through these
regimes.
As discussed above, “normative slippage” could be what has so
confounded securities regulators. Both the SEC and the OSC used the
business case rationale in justifying their current diversity regimes. Yet,
the regulators encounter serious difficulty when they attempt to regulate
what is truly a social justice or fairness issue masked in business case
rationales. The result of this in both the US and Canada is weak diversity
policies which have not made a noticeable difference in advancing the
social justice goals which appear to be the primary motivation behind the
implementation of such policies. Even if we accept that the true objectives
of the policies were to increase board gender diversity to enhance firm
performance, neither increases board gender diversity or enhances firm
performance. Another regulatory option, of course, is a regulation which
is intrusive and which faces broader administrative law challenges. The
regulators cannot be seen to damage the capital markets (which is arguably
what occurred in Norway, with its abrupt introduction of a mandatory
quota) nor can they be seen to act beyond their mandate. What then is the
answer? That is yet unclear, but perhaps with a re-statement of the business
case and the lessons which the securities regulators can take from the
example discussed below, regulations encouraging enhanced gender
diversity which do not conflict with other laws can be implemented.
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HANG TEN: THE CHANGING TIDE IN THE WAKE OF CALIFORNIA
SENATE BILL 826
A.

What It Says and Why It Was Drafted

Senate Bill No. 826 (Bill 826) was recently signed in California.
This Bill adds sections 301.3 and 2115.5 to the Corporations Code. Bill
826 requires public corporations with “principal executive offices” located
in California to have a minimum of one female director. This minimum
number is to increase over time to at least two female directors if the board
has five or more members, or 3 directors if the board has at least six
members by the year 2021.213 In its declaration, the legislature outlined
several rationales for this highly intrusive bill. First, it states in no
uncertain terms, that more female directors on public corporations’ boards
will have a positive impact on California’s economy.214 It then lists a
number of empirical studies, the results of which indicate a positive
relationship between greater gender diversity and enhanced financial
performance.215 Further on, it synthesizes a number of studies which
attempt to show that a critical mass of women increases the board’s
efficacy, including the McKinsey report as described above.216 In sections
1(e)-(f), the declaration describes the particulars of under-representation
of women on corporate boards in California, specifically mentioning that
as of June 2017, only 15.5% of board seats in California were occupied by
women. It is estimated that at the current rate it will take 40 to 50 years to
reach gender parity among Russell 3000 companies across the United
States.217
By March 1 2020, the Secretary of State will publish a list of those
corporations who are in compliance with Bill 826, those that moved their
head offices in to or out of California, and those that were subject to the
law but that went private in the preceding year.218 Finally, there will be
fines of $100 000 for first time violations of these amendments and $300
000 for subsequent violations levied against firms that do not comply. 219

213

Bill 826, supra note 6 at 94.
Id. at section 1(a).
215
Id. at section 1(c).
216
Id. at section 1(g).
217
Id. at subsections 1 (e)-(f).
218
Id. at section 2(d).
219
Id. at section 2(e).
214

320BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW VOL. XII:II
A few important things can be gleaned from the text of the
amendments themselves and from the Legislative Declaration
accompanying them. First, the legislature is still attempting to justify a law
with a business case rationale based on financial performance arguments
while also recognizing that, notwithstanding any performance advantages,
this is simply the right thing to do. Bill 826 runs into the same difficulty
as the other American and Canadian regimes and the business case in
general. That is, it justifies increased gender diversity on corporate boards
by citing the instrumental value this will bring, implying that in the
absence of such financial value it may not be worth doing. While largely
focusing on the financial performance case, the very first section of the
bill asserts that increasing the number of female board directors will, in
turn, lead to more opportunities for women in the workplace and laments
the fact that if something is not done, gender parity will not be reached for
40 to 50 years.220 Thus it is likely that this bill is in fact motivated by social
justice considerations and not purely, or even primarily, economic reasons.
B.

Polarizing Reaction

Bill 826 has already precipitated some polarized reactions in both
the scholarly world and in the media. For those who support stronger
regulation and are not as concerned about state interference with the
private sector, this bill was more than welcome and its supporters hope
that it will lead to some real change. On the other hand, for those who are
less enthusiastic about state interference with the inner workings of the
corporate board, and especially those who see Bill 826 as flouting the
Internal Affairs Doctrine,221 this bill was a clear over-reach of state power
and will not have any notable positive impact.
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Those in Favor of Quotas

While it is still early days, many applaud Bill 826 as a step in the
right direction.222 As Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson puts it: “This is one of
the last bastions of total male domination…We know that the public and
business are not being well-served by this level of discrimination.”223 This
comment, along with another statement she made to the press, makes it
clear that this bill is rooted in social justice as well as business case
rationales. In her other press statement, she said “…and I believe
constitutional issues are ultimately for the courts to decide. Due to
persistent inequality and discrimination at the highest levels of corporate
leadership, women are being denied access and opportunity, and I believe
there is an extremely compelling state interest in California moving
forward to protect women and the state’s economy.”224
Still others see the new regime as a way to achieve critical masses
of women directors in the boardroom.225 Critical mass, as previously
discussed, may be the missing link between greater board gender diversity
and enhanced firm financial performance.
Before this bill, scholars in the US and Canada had suggested
quotas as a solution to the under-representation of women on boards.
Willey, for instance, advocates for quotas as a short term fix. They may be
what is necessary to effect immediate change in the current state of gender
imbalance on boards in Canada. Though she acknowledges that
implementation of quotas would likely be “an uphill battle,” in the
alternative, she pushes for strengthening NI 58-101F1 with stated targets
222
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within the comply-or-explain regime at the very least.226 She describes the
current policy as an “explain-or-explain” rather than a comply-or-explain
regime because the regulators have neglected to set actual targets against
which company performance could be benchmarked.227 NI 58-101F1, she
describes, is a weak intervention and one which will not effect, and indeed
has not effected, much change.228
In the US, Alstott, in 2014, also advocated for gender quotas on
corporate boards in the US. She argues that the “the state makes massive
expenditures to further social and economic policy under the guise of ‘tax
incentives’.”229 Tax law further penalizes corporations for behavior that is
socially harmful, which means Alstott reasons, that legislators are already
advancing “substantive” corporate governance goals.230 In addition to tax
law, securities regulation has engaged in substantive corporate governance
since the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley. Alstott believes that if
“designed with sensitivity to exceptional U.S. institutions,”231 quotas
could fit very well within the US tax and securities laws. Importantly
though, she notes that federal law is better suited to mandate quotas than
state law.232
Since Bill 826’s introduction, there has not been very much time
for academics to publish papers about its implementation. However one
scholar, Joseph Grundfest, has written a piece raising serious concerns
about the Bill’s potential efficacy and approach to regulating gender
diversity.233
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2. Those Opposed
Grundfest argues that Bill 826 will come up against the Internal
Affairs Doctrine, and as a result its effects will be negligible.234 Because
of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, the bill will only be applicable to
corporations that are both incorporated under California corporate law and
have their headquarters in California. Given the small number of large
corporations that are both headquartered and incorporated in California,
this leaves only 50 Fortune 500 corporations subject to the quota. Many of
these corporations are already compliant with the bill’s provisions.
Grundfest concludes that only one corporation, Apple, will have to add a
female director to its board. In total, therefore, Grundfest asserts that Bill
826 will result in the addition of one single female board member to the
Fortune 500.235 Before it can make any difference, he says it will be
subject to litigation regarding equal protection.236 Furthermore, he argues
that this bill will set back other affirmative action causes. Opponents of
affirmative action, Grundfest predicts, will use Bill 826 as the jumping off
point of a slippery slope argument for what else in the private sector state
and federal legislatures will be able to regulate.237 Lastly, he pushes for
action by institutional investors, rather than legislators, in tackling this
issue, as institutional investors can produce substantial change quickly.238
Stephen Bainbridge provides a critique similar to Grundfest’s, adding that
the application of the Internal Affairs Doctrine will be up to the US
Supreme Court to decide, but given the jurisprudence, it will probably
agree with the position that California cannot require corporations
incorporated in other jurisdictions, such as Delaware, to add more women
to their boards.239
234

Id. at 4–6.
Id.
236
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Grundfest speculates that Bill 826, if met
with litigation, may be subject to enhanced scrutiny on equal protection grounds.
Grunfest, supra note 233 at 6–8. For the most part, equal protection and how it
relates to Bill 826 is beyond the scope of this paper. See Id. There has been one
legal challenge launched in relation to Bill 826. Judicial Watch, a conservative
activist group, has commenced a suit against California’s Secretary of State,
which contains allegations that the law is discriminatory on the basis of sex and
so unconstitutional, see Judicial Watch Sues California over Gender Quota
Mandate for Corporate Boards, JUDICIAL WATCH (Aug. 9, 2019)
https://www.judicialwatch.org/press-releases/judicial-watch-sues-californiaover-gender-quota-mandate-for-corporate-boards/.
237
Grundfest, supra note 233, at 6–8.
238
Id. at 8–12.
239
Stephen Bainbridge, Can California Require Delaware Corporations
to Comply with California’s New Board of Director Gender Diversity Mandate?
235

324BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW VOL. XII:II
Others see the debate surrounding Bill 826 as a stakeholder versus
shareholder issue. SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce made her thoughts on
Bill 826 clear in a speech at the Annual SEC Conference for Corporate
Reporting and Governance.240 She argues that proposals like those found
in Bill 826 require corporations to consider not just its shareholders, but
the interests of all women as stakeholders. “Opening such a wide door
introduces uncertainty and political influence into corporate
operations.”241 Peirce goes on to cite the US corporate law as it relates to
directors’ duties which she interprets to be owed principally to
shareholders.242 Aside from this picture of directors’ duties being up for
debate, Peirce’s assertion that corporations with headquarters in California
now must view all women as stakeholders is an overstatement. At most,
these corporations may have to extend their searches for new directors to
a wider range of candidates. At the very least, it will means corporations
will be incentivized to consider those who have appropriate experience
and who are qualified female candidates more seriously when they fill
their board seats.
Finally, the Californian Chamber of Commerce has come forward
with criticism of the bill as well. The Chamber is for corporations
autonomously deciding who should be on their boards. Furthermore, in its
view, this bill will make other diversity initiatives more difficult. The vicepresident for policy has been quoted as saying: “It creates a challenge for
a board on achieving broader diversity goals,”243 because it puts gender
before other kinds of diversity, such as racial and ethnic diversity.244
One common thread throughout the criticism of Bill 826, even for
those who agree with the policy goals of the bill, is that it is likely to face
extreme, if not fatal, constitutional challenges.
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What Bill 826 May Mean for the Future
in the United States and Canada

If Bill 826 does withstand the challenges it faces, this may lead to
a few outcomes. First, companies may simply ignore the quota and pay the
fines. For large corporations especially, the fines may simply become a
cost of doing business and certainly a few hundred thousand dollars every
year will not put any issuer with a large market capitalization out of
business. Bill 826 may have a greater impact on those publicly traded firms
with smaller market capitalizations. A second possibility is that
corporations will move their head offices out of California, which could
have a negative impact on California’s economy. The opposite of this is
also possible. In attempting to send a message to investors and the public,
corporations which see diversity as a worthwhile endeavor may
intentionally move their head offices to California, or comply with the
provisions of the statute while remaining in other jurisdictions.
Since Bill 826’s implementation, other states have begun to
implement similar legislation. A bill was signed in Illinois for instance
which originally would have required Illinois corporations to have one
female and one African American director. 245 However, before the bill
was signed it was amended to require that firms only disclose the
demographics of their boards.246 It has not become clear yet what this bill
may mean for public companies in Illinois.247 More broadly in the US and
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Canada, perhaps California’s divisive bill will encourage other
jurisdictions to follow suit.
And perhaps this will also prompt a conversation in Canada
between the provincial regulators and soon-to-be national regulator,248
investors, scholars, and those subject to securities regulation. Canada,
given its pattern of observing American corporate governance regimes and
frequently implementing policies to imitate and sometimes improve upon
them, may see this as an opportunity to push for stronger regulation.
If indeed Bill 826 fails, then perhaps Canada and other US states
can still learn from it, depending on the reason for its failure. For instance,
if it is to fail because of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, then because Canada
has no such doctrine, something like Bill 826 may still be successful in
Canada. If it fails because corporations begin to use the fines as a license
fee for doing business in California, then small companies will be much
more likely to comply with the quotas than large companies. In Canada
where there is a great deal of very small publicly traded corporations, the
effects of a law like Bill 826 could be quite dramatic. Either way,
California’s Bill 826 has already begun to make waves.
CONCLUSION
Although the United States and Canada have substantively
different board diversity policies implemented for ostensibly different
purposes, the impacts of both the SEC’s policy found in Regulation S-K
and the Canadian policy found in NI 58-101F1 are strikingly similar. I
have advanced the argument that both policies were met with very little
traction because in truth both regulators implemented these policies out of
a concern for what is right, rather than the reasons which the regulators
openly provided. Moreover, the conceptions of the issue arising out of the
under-representation of women on boards are the same in both
jurisdictions. There is a slight diversion between the two in what the role
of the board is and whether it is only to maximize shareholder wealth, or
whether it is rather to fulfil a broader fiduciary duty to the corporation,
which may involve considering non-shareholder interests.
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American legal scholars historically seem to view command-andcontrol regulation with much more passionate disdain than Canadian
scholars as well. While American scholars harshly criticize commandand-control regulation, the current Canadian diversity regime has not gone
without criticism. It has been referred to as an “explain-or-explain policy”
and a weak intervention.249 Interestingly, it was California that
implemented a very stringent quota regime, not Canada. This law has so
far polarized scholarly and media opinion. Perhaps other states will follow
suit. Perhaps this bill will spark consideration of quotas in Canada. Or
perhaps Bill 826 is destined to die at the hands of the Internal Affairs
Doctrine.
What is needed now is a re-statement of the business case; a restatement that outlines definitively why businesses and securities
regulators should promote greater gender diversity on public corporate
boards. This may require further research which takes into account critical
mass and shareholder rights. Alternatively, regulators could be more
transparent about what exactly the objectives are behind the diversity
regimes they have implemented. They could justify stronger regulations
with a clear assertion that they are advancing normative goals, so long as
these regulations do not damage the capital markets and still fit within their
mandates. If we accept Alstott’s argument that tax and securities regulators
already promote social goals through substantive corporate governance
regulation, then it does follow that the SEC could introduce a stronger
diversity policy. What might be necessary in the scholarship is a definitive
link between greater board gender diversity (outside of the traditional
business case) and the regulators’ mandates.
On the other hand, perhaps a multi-actor solution is the answer.250
While institutional investors may be helping with the effort to increase
boardroom diversity, the jury is still out on whether shareholder activism
in general creates long-term value or whether it is only useful for creating
short-term value.251
There has been some small amount of progress made. If there is
to be more, calls for diversity must not stop. Ultimately, in the US and
Canada stronger regulation will be necessary that transparently recognizes
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and works towards achieving what is right and what is good for business
without conflating the two.

